Are The Democratic Socialists Winning or Losing?
2026-08-13 09:45:00 • 29:40
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From the New York Times, I'm Natalie Kittro-F.
This is The Daily.
The left wing of the Democratic Party has now faced key tests in two swing states, and the
results were mixed.
On Tuesday, Democratic Socialist Francesca Hong lost the Democratic nomination for governor
in Wisconsin in an upset after leading by double digits in the polls.
And last week in Michigan, despite being heavily outspent by his opponent, Abdul El-Sahed won
the Democratic nomination for Senate by a slim margin.
Today, my colleague, Chief Political Analyst Nate Cohn, helps make sense of those conflicting
outcomes and explains what they tell us about the state of the populist left in Democratic
politics.
It's Thursday, August 13th.
Nate, welcome back to The Daily.
It's wonderful to have you here.
Great to be here.
So we want to talk today about what this moment means for the Democratic Party.
For the past ten years, it feels as though we've been talking about this divide in the party
between the progressive left and the moderate establishment.
And it feels like the story of this primary season for Democrats is to what extent is
that progressive flank ascendant in the party and in national politics.
In the last two weeks, one of those candidates, narrowly one in Michigan and another narrow
ly lost in Wisconsin.
I don't totally know what to make of that.
It feels a little confusing to me, but fortunately, that's what we have you for.
So Nate, what should we make of that?
Fortunately, I think it isn't very confusing.
It's pre-clarifying.
Oh.
We've had two raises and two weeks in states that are presidential battleground states reasonably
representative of the country politically in different ways, where the progressive left
has essentially been tied a little bit ahead or a little bit behind with their establishment
rivals.
This is pretty different from what we've seen over most of the last ten years when the
progressive left has basically only been reliably competitive and heavily democratic, young,
highly educated urban areas.
Now that can happen twice in two weeks after all in presidential battleground states,
and therefore perhaps even nationwide that still comes with limits.
There are large parts of these states where the progressive candidates aren't faring
very well.
And that suggests there are also large parts of the country where the progressive left
wouldn't fare very well.
But this represents a really significant improvement in their standing within the democratic
party compared to where they seem to stand just a few years ago.
Okay.
I want to dig deeper into what you actually mean by the limits that these candidates are
facing and what they've actually gained.
But before we do, can you just spell out what we mean exactly when we talk about the
left here?
Like, who are these candidates?
I heard a sigh.
It's a little challenging to define.
We don't just mean progressives after all.
Progressives have been winning democratic primaries for decades, half of Democrats in
Congress could be said to be progressives in some form or another.
We mean a new kind of young activist backed candidate of, for lack of a better word, the
progressive left.
Mm-hmm.
I think the core of this new activist progressive left are the self-identified democratic
socialist, Mamdani, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and their allies.
Beyond them, though, there is a group of politicians who looks a lot like them, but does not necessarily
characterize themselves as democratic socialist.
Like who?
Dr. Abdul-El-Sayed in Michigan is one great example.
He was endorsed by both Sanders and Ocasio-Cortez, but he doesn't call himself a democratic socialist.
But it's hard to see why he's not a democratic socialist.
He doesn't distinguish himself from them on the issues in many ways.
And he's comfortable outlying with them and importantly outlying with them against
the mainstream of the democratic party.
To data wise, when you look at the numbers, which are your bread and butter, you're looking
at candidates who are either members of the democratic socialist organization or are
effectively part of that platform.
They are aligned with many aspects of it.
Yeah, there are a lot of different ways to define it, but they stand apart from not only
the establishment moderate in the democratic party, but also the kind of progressive candidate
who's been winning in the democratic party for a long time.
Okay.
And the question going into the last couple of weeks right was whether this progressive
left could win, not just in places like New York, deep blue areas, but in purple areas,
states like Michigan and Wisconsin.
So let's get into what we learned from the two democratic primaries in those states.
I think the most obvious thing we learned is that yes, the progressive left can compete
in these states.
Now it's worth noting that each of these races are idiosyncratic primaries.
They have different candidates with different strengths and weaknesses in Michigan in a primary
for US Senate.
Democrat Dr. Abdul-Elsaid ran a campaign that received a lot of enthusiasm from progressives across
the country.
And he ran against Congresswoman Haley Stevens, an establishment back candidate who had the
advantage of tens of millions of dollars in advertisements, even though she had her own
liabilities like being a really strong supporter of Israel at a time when that's pretty unpopular
among rank and file Democrats.
There was a totally different set of circumstances in Wisconsin.
That was a race for governor where Francesca Hong, a democratic socialist, did not run an
especially strong race.
She did not earn endorsements from people like Alexandria, Acacia Cortez, or Bernie Sanders.
She had a long track record of posting and making remarks on social media that did not
make her seem like a terribly compelling politician.
Much of the final week of the campaign was spent litigating social media posts about how
she had problems with Thanksgiving and Halloween.
This was not necessarily the best candidate that the progressive left has put forward.
On the other hand, the moderate wing of the Democratic Party almost failed to put forward
a candidate in this race.
It cycled through multiple potential front runners who entered the race and dropped out
of the race.
And in some cases came back into the race.
And only in the final days of the campaign did the party appear to coalesce behind David
Crowley, who was a relatively unknown candidate from Milwaukee County, but who did not have
any statewide reputation or tens of millions of dollars backing him during the campaign.
But despite all the differences that we just worked through between these two different
races, we still ended up with the same basic result.
Michigan and Wisconsin ended up essentially dead even.
The progressive candidate narrowly won one race and narrowly lost the other.
But the story was basically the same.
The same demographic groups aligned between each ones.
They showed the same strengths.
They showed the same weaknesses.
And the fact that the results are so similar suggests that the most powerful factor that
shaping what's happening in these races are these underlying big divides in the national
Democratic Party, not the idiosyncrasities of these races.
And so I think we can learn a lot from them as a result.
All right.
Nate, walk us through those underlying divides.
What were the demographic groups that aligned behind these progressive left candidates?
I think you have to start with age.
The most obvious thing that's driving support for the progressive left, both in the actual
results when you look at it precinct by precincter County by county and in the polling is that
young voters overwhelmingly back the candidates of the progressive left while older voters support
moderate established from candidates.
The polls say that they won overwhelming margins like 60, 70, maybe even 80% of the vote.
And that's what we see in the youngest neighborhoods and precincts of these states, particularly
on the college campuses of the big flagship universities like the University of Michigan
or the University of Wisconsin Madison.
There are precincts where else I had one 95% of the vote in Ann Arbor.
There are precincts that are sort of for lack of a better word, young hip gentrifying neighborhoods
in Milwaukee where you see similarly maybe not 95% of the outside margins, but 70, 80% margins,
even for Francesca Hong.
That is crazy.
Why do you think that is?
Do we have a sense of what is driving young voters and not older voters to these candidates?
Well, in some sense, this is a story that we've seen in the Democratic Party for decades.
Now, young voters who come of age and are dissatisfied with the country and want to see
changes then look naturally to something that's even farther to the left of what the Democratic
Party has offered in the past.
And then that's what the young voters campaign on, whether it's in the 1960s and the civil
rights movement, Barack Obama versus Hillary Clinton, or now other Democratic socialists
against the kind of mainstream progressivism of the Obama era.
I think that sentiment has been supercharged by some particular factors to this moment.
The struggles that young people think they have in today's post-financial crisis economy.
And I think it's also worth mentioning the way that for lack of a better word, the intellectual
climate of today's age shapes the views of young voters.
There are ideas from academia about capitalism and sexism and white supremacy.
In intersectionality, they're all very familiar to us today, but which an older generation
of college graduates had never heard of, even while we're all familiar with Judith Butler
or something.
So I think this really shapes the kind of ideas that young college educated voters are receptive
to.
So although in the past, they've always been kind of receptive to the most left candidate.
It's now being channeled into a particular set of ideas that older generations don't
even know about, let alone support.
Okay, so these candidates did numbers with younger voters.
What else does the data say about the divides here, about the coalitions?
I think the next biggest divide, it's maybe easier to talk about by flipping it around
and saying where did the moderates do best?
And in both states, high income neighborhoods, high income voters stand out as a major
area of strength for moderates with income in general, just being one of the key fault
lines here.
Neighborhoods where people make $150,000 or more, there were often cases where the moderate
candidates won by two to one.
I don't think this should be terribly surprising, but if the progressive left in general,
and these candidates specifically really stand for anything in terms of policy, it's to
take on the billionaires, corporations, and wealth inequality in the country.
And it makes sense that high income voters would be particularly hesitant to embrace those
kind of candidates.
And you go below the high income group, there's a lot more heterogeneity in the results.
And part of that comes down to age, right?
There are low income voters who are young college kids or people just out of college who
are very supportive of the progressives.
And then there are also low income older voters and those low income older voters may still
support the establishment.
Uh huh.
And I think there's one additional point to make and that's the divide over race.
The establishment candidates in both of these contests did really well among black voters.
Now, it's worth noting that, as I've mentioned, both these races are idiosyncratic and both
of the establishment friendly candidates had particularly strong cases for black voters.
Haley Stevens trumpeted her work with the Obama administration on the Detroit Auto bailout.
David Crowley is African American himself.
So he had natural appeal to Milwaukee's black voters.
And it's worth noting that we have seen over and over again that establishment back candidates
do better than progressive candidates among black voters.
I feel like I'm turning into a broken record here, Nate, but why do we know why that is?
I think the easiest place to start is to remember that black voters almost unanimously
support Democrats and many black voters support Democrats, regardless of their views on
the issues.
Many more moderate or even conservative black voters who vote for Democrats than other
racial groups because for other racial groups, the moderate and conservative voters would
just vote Republican.
So in the black primary electorate, you have many more moderate and conservative black voters
who at the very least are not exactly receptive to the case for for Democratic socialism or
may even outright oppose it.
The other thing to keep in mind is that in many Democratic primaries as of late, older
black voters have turned out at much higher levels than young voters.
It may be the case that young black voters support the progressive candidates in these
races and just really hard to tell because the turnout among young black voters has been
really low really in some ways.
It's been really low since the Obama era.
So we have a disproportionately older group of black voters who's participating in these
primaries as well.
And again, old voters, regardless of race, are backing the establishment candidate.
Bottom line, Nate, at this moment, when we see these areas of strength and of weakness
for the progressive left being highlighted, should we think of this movement that Bernie
Sanders more or less started in 2016 as ascendant and gaining ground or stalling out?
I think we should think of it as ascendant and gaining ground, especially if we bracket
Bernie Sanders aside for a second.
If you bracket aside his campaign, we've watched the progressive left grow from only occasionally
winning a handful of primaries in the nation's most highly educated and democratic cities
to now competing statewide in classic battleground states like Michigan and Wisconsin.
That said, this is a very different kind of progressive coalition than the one that Bernie
Sanders put together back in 2016.
And it's different in ways that say a lot about where the progressive movement might be
heading in 2028 and beyond.
We'll be right back.
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Nate, describe exactly how the progressive coalition has changed since 2016.
I think to understand it's worth stepping back and remembering what the Bernie Sanders coalition
looked like in 2016 against Hillary Clinton.
At its core, there was the same young progressive democratic socialist activist group that's still
at the core of the progressive movement today.
But what's changed is the group of voters beyond that democratic socialist core, the sort
of swing voters of democratic primary politics, the people who aren't necessarily true believers,
but who preferred Bernie Sanders to his opponent Hillary Clinton.
In that election in 2016, the voters who preferred Sanders to Clinton even though they weren't
true believers were mostly working class and particularly working class white voters.
Bernie Sanders swept rural parts of Michigan and Wisconsin.
And he did so in part because he was relentlessly focused on a populous message.
And in part because Hillary Clinton was sort of the perfect foil on economic populist issues,
she had back NAFTA and had taken all of this money from speeches, from corporations,
and so on.
And she also campaigned pretty heavily on identity politics for lack of a better word.
In that election, she was the candidate trying to rally the supporters of Black Lives Matter.
And she was also running as potentially the first female president.
And those were major points of emphasis in her campaign.
And together that seemed to give Bernie Sanders the edge among white working class Democrats
across much of the Northern United States in particular.
And even once she became the nominee, Hillary Clinton still struggled among these voters.
Many of them actually ended up backing Donald Trump and have been part of the Republican
coalition really ever since and they haven't even been available to candidates of the progressive
left in many cases.
If you were to look at the map of Wisconsin and Michigan the last couple of weeks compared
to the 2016 one, they look completely different.
They're not winning those rural areas anymore.
And just say why Nate?
Because the core of the argument for a lot of these left-wing candidates is economic populism,
right?
I mean, El Sayyads campaign slogan was money out of politics, money in your pocket,
Medicare for all.
It's absolutely an important part of their message.
And as I alluded to earlier, they do tend to do better among lower income voters than
certainly rich voters.
But this is not necessarily nearly as central to their message as it was to Bernie Sanders'
message.
And conversely, I'm not sure that today's moderate Democrats are as vulnerable on these
issues as Hillary Clinton was.
There is on balance compared to 2016 much more emphasis by progressives on non-economic
issues period, Gaza, for instance.
And now I'm not saying that Gaza alienates white working class Democrats.
But every second that you spend talking about Gaza is a second you're not talking about
as Bernie would put it, the millionaires and the billionaires, right?
And so if most of the conversation about your campaign is about the issues that animate
activist progressives, the fact that you then try and turn your message back to putting
money in people's pockets won't be as powerful as it would be if that were all you were
talking about.
And I think it's fair to say that's what the Bernie Sanders campaign did in 2016 that
we just don't see from progressive sense then.
Got it.
So today's progressives have made up for this by doing much better than Bernie Sanders
did among a different group of voters who are sort of outside that core democratic socialist
activist base, which is they're doing much better among for lack of better work, kind
of mainstream progressive liberals.
You can imagine the sort of person who watches MSNBC and the suburbs, for instance, who
voted for Hillary Clinton or Elizabeth Warren and Joe Biden in 2020.
They're actually quite sympathetic to what the progressives have to say about all of
the various issues we just talked about like Gaza or the Black Lives Matter movement.
They may not be democratic socialists, but they are real progressives.
And in the past, they didn't support Bernie Sanders and they have been voting for mainstream
Democrats.
But now they're pretty disillusioned with the Democratic Party.
It's failed to make good on its promise to defeat Donald Trump.
They want to see someone fight back against Donald Trump in Washington and they're just looking
for a candidate who offers bigger kind of changes to a country that voters have been
to satisfy with for decades.
And right now, the Democratic Socialist Progressive Act of its wing of the Democratic Party is offering
something like that.
And so these voters who have voted maybe for more moderate candidates in the past, they're
pretty open to backing progressive candidates today.
Those folks basically aren't alienated by some of that culture war messaging.
They may even like it.
They may like it and they're so frustrated with the Democratic establishment that they
want a cast of protest vote in some cases.
And I think it could be even more than a protest vote.
They may look at the Democratic Socialists and say, you know what?
I've always supported universal healthcare and that's what they say they support too.
I don't like what Israel is doing.
I agree with that.
So they may not, again, consider themselves Democratic Socialists.
They may not be activists for the Democratic Socialist cause, but they may not see themselves
as very different on a long list of issues.
I guess my question is, is that a winning coalition?
Is that enough to win in purple places in a general election?
No.
I mean, you can win a Democratic primary with a core of Democratic Socialist plus sort
of mainstream liberals, but to win a general election, you need to win a lot more than
that.
You have to win the rank and file of the Democratic Party and then a lot of more moderate
voters who don't consider themselves Democrats who are independence or who may even in
some cases be relatively conservative voters.
Then does that suggest that these candidates will have to kind of win back those white working
class voters, the ones who voted for Trump?
And if they stick to the economic populism message and de-emphasize the other stuff, is
that a path forward?
Do they need to do that to broaden their coalition?
Well, I think that's what the Progressive C for themselves.
I think they want to try and win back some number of white working class or at least working
class voters in general with a message focused on economic populism.
I don't think that's necessarily very realistic.
You can sort of see that in its own way in these Democratic primaries.
They can talk about economic populism a lot.
They can even make that the focus of their campaign, so the extent they can.
But they're going to be defined by the broader set of issues that they're associated with
and that they're really passionate about.
There's not going to be a version of Dr. El Sayed who doesn't talk about Gaza and who
doesn't talk about all the other issues that Progressives have been campaigning on for
the last 10 years.
But to win a general election, they're probably going to need to win and a fairly
conventional weight for a Democrat to try and be acceptable enough to voters who are dissatisfied
with Donald Trump.
Some of them are working class, some of them are rich and affluent, some of them may be
the kind of voters that Progressives dream of winning.
And some of them may bear no resemblance to that.
But they're stuck playing, I think, a fundamentally conventional general election game.
Nate, another big part of this debate among Democrats is whether these socialists or
socialists adjacent candidates may drag Democrats down in other parts of the country by giving
Republicans this opening to cast the entire party as too radical.
How do you think that dynamic might play out as we get closer to the general?
Well, I think it's true to some extent.
When you vote for a Democratic candidate, you're voting both for the person and to put
a party in power.
And to the extent voters sour on putting the Democratic Party in power because they perceive
it as being farther left than they are, that could hurt Democratic candidates in parts
of the country who have nothing to do with the progressive left.
That said, I think in most of these races that Democratic candidates will succeed in defining
themselves, certainly the strong Democratic candidates with their own individual brands
who have the resources to air television advertisements about themselves, they have an
opportunity to define themselves.
So I wouldn't expect it to prevent more moderate Democrats from winning in much of the country,
and if it is undoubtedly some additional burden that they have to overcome.
Obviously, we spent this time looking at, as you said, idiosyncratic races.
So I don't want to extrapolate too much here, but given the broader dynamics that you've
laid out about this left wing coalition, I wonder how you're also thinking about its
place in the future of the party beyond these midterms.
Like, Crystal Ball, a little bit for me.
There's an unmistakable trend towards the progressive left in Democratic politics.
We've talked about that already.
And as generations turn over, and more young people enter the Democratic electorate and
as more older moderates age out of the Democratic electorate, I think it's possible we could
see this trend continue.
It would not surprise me to see a candidate progressive left win the Democratic nomination
in 2028 if they have a strong enough candidate to pull it off or if the establishment is disorganized
like it was in Wisconsin.
Now that said, it doesn't make it inevitable that progressive activists will take over
the Democratic party.
And mainstream Democrats will try and co-opt elements of this message.
They're going to try and appeal on the same kind of themes about economic populism.
We just saw Gavin Newsom say the divide in America in politics today is in between left
and right.
It's between top and down.
Mainstream Democrats are getting a message here.
And this is pretty common in American politics that activists elevate and issue in the mainstream
of the party ultimately subsumes it.
But then what would happen to all of the more hardcore supporters of that socialist DSA
platform?
Imagine that they would get on board for a much more diluted version of the thing that
has them so energized.
This is a cop out answer, but it'll obviously vary from person to person group to group.
There are going to be some die hard Democratic socialists who will say that any person who
doesn't reject the system of capitalism is complicit in the oppression of, you know,
the working classes around the world, right?
There are also going to be progressives who understand that it's important to work within
the Democratic Party to gradually change it over time and in different cases.
The relative balance of which two paths, different parts of the left take is going to vary.
If Gavin Newsom wins the Democratic nomination because he adopted a buzzword about top versus
bottom, it's going to be a little different than if it's, say, a John Ossoff who centers corruption
and taking on the billionaires in this campaign, right?
So there are a lot of subtleties here.
But I think over the long run, the thing that's sort of guaranteed is that if the progressive
left becomes strong enough the Democratic Party, it is going to change the Democratic Party
one way or another.
If the mainstream of the party resists it, that's when you have the opportunity for a real
hostile takeover like what happened to the Republicans.
I think it's too early to say whether we're going to see something more like a hostile
takeover or more like the mainstream of the Democratic Party letting the Democratic Socialists
in and gradually allow it to change the party.
In some cases, you'll see some of both.
I think over the medium term, I would expect to see the mainstream of the Democratic Party
try and embrace economic populism, try and take a more anti-Israel stance.
That may be enough to prevent a true takeover of the Democratic Party by Democratic Socialists,
even as the Democratic Party moves to the left as a consequence.
But the natural tendency for a party is to try and assimilate all of its parts and to
forge a coalition to use a word that we've used probably too many times in this episode.
That's the natural way for the party to end up.
Well, Nate, I love having you in my coalition as a colleague.
Oh, God.
And thanks for coming on the show.
Thanks for having me.
Hello.
Hi, this is Jody.
Hi Jody, how are you?
This is Caitlin calling for The New York Times.
Good, how are you?
I'm doing well.
I really appreciate you taking some time to talk to me.
Yeah, we're in an interesting state, no?
You really are.
How does it feel?
It's stressful, totally stressful, because there's so much at stake.
On Wednesday, one day after the Democratic primary for governor in Wisconsin, Daily Producer
Caitlin O'Keefe called voters there to understand how they were processing the results.
Can you tell me who you voted for in the primary on Tuesday?
Yes, I voted for Francesca Holland.
Francesca was my choice.
Ultimately, I ended up voting for David Crowley.
I voted for David Crowley.
I just thought more important than voting for exactly who I'd be more passionate about.
We need to get somebody in there that can win the race.
When I saw that Crowley had won with just over 3,000 votes shy, it was a huge sense of
relief for me, but a little bit of anxiety that we got that close.
I really appreciated the progressive views on affordable health care, universal childcare,
public schools, the minimum wage.
My two daughters are middle income and are struggling.
I don't see a way out of it.
My grandkids, they're having such hard time finding jobs.
It didn't used to be that way.
I'm just not for the establishment right now.
I feel like they just keep going along the same path.
I think we need to wipe this late clean, start over.
It's not working.
What would you say to somebody who looks at Holland's loss in Wisconsin?
And this is proof that the Democratic Socialist of America and that platform can't win
across the country.
Hello.
Good ideas have been coming from the progressive movement for years.
And sometimes they get more footing, sometimes they don't, they get to wait their time.
I think there are repairs we can make to our capitalist system without completely upending
everything.
When essentially your platform is just here and all down and rebuild, I don't think
we can start all down and rebuild.
I think that we need to prepare our democracy and progress and experiment that we're on.
We'll be right back.
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We put together the ultimate moving guide and I wanted to find out a few of our writers'
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When you're first moving into your home, make sure that you changed a bad easy-use mouth
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Make sure you have towels on hand.
You don't want to end up taking a shower and using a dirty sock to dry off?
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Here's what else you need to know today.
The Trump administration plans to spend millions of dollars equipping immigration officers with
gloves that can deliver electric shocks on contact to induce compliance.
The gloves, which are sometimes referred to as stun gloves, take only a second to be
switched on by pressing a button and they're made by a Kentucky company called Compliant
Technologies.
The company says that the gloves emit a much lower voltage than a taser.
The Homeland Security Department described the gloves as a de-escalation device but didn't
answer questions about whether they might be used to apprehend people or in encounters
with protesters.
Today's episode was produced by Caitlin O'Keefe, Jack DeSodoro and Carlos Prieto.
It was edited by Rob Zipco and Paige Cowod with help from Lizzo Bayland and contains music
by Pat McCusker, Dan Powell and Marion Luzano.
Our theme music is by Wonderly.
This episode was engineered by Alyssa Moxley.
That's it for the Daily.
I'm Natalie Kittrowett.
See you tomorrow.
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