Supplementary Material 56: 10% for AI Doom, Bespoke Debates, and Eurotrash DJs

2026-10-04 08:00:00 • 26:00

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Hello and welcome to the pudding the

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who's supplementary material edition with the cognitive anthropologist slash

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psychologist me Christopher Kavman and the pure psychologist the man more rational than

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same-herosome friend I meant to say more rationality than man

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my food. I'm a cybernetic man at this point. I'm incredibly cybernetic.

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Am I talking to you or your agentic process? It's hard to tell. It's hard to tell at this point

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with with conjoined but yeah lots of things happening in AI lane but we should not

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like to talk about AI because it's just an AI podcast and you and I AI experts. No but then again

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it is supplementary materials so we can do what we want. We say whatever the hell we want.

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That's right and I think we do have plans to talk to suitable experts relatively soon. We'll see

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we'll see and we can get them. We can get anyone with that big now. Can we? We can try. We can

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send them emails that's what we. They're climbing over each other to get on our show Chris.

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Can you? Don't be nervous. Yeah. Well be that as it may. Yeah so it's a bit past the time

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map but we can't mention in passing. I think we should mention in passing. You know the hugging

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face it feels like old news now. It's like yesterday. It's happened. Two weeks is a long time in

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2026. That's right. Yeah. I do remember it. Do you remember it?

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Um if for those listeners you might not be familiar with hugging face. They'll be like we

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have face huggers surely. You mean from the alien franchise? Yeah and you'd be wrong.

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Yeah and not quite. Do you have enough memory of what the hugging? How would you describe it,

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Matt? Okay. I'm a you know a bit of in the words. Wondering not in the words.

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My way. What's a hugging face incident? I feel like we're going to get the child

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grow up its face and what do you say to it? All right. All right. So apologies first of

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because it's going to be very brief because we don't. Yeah. If you're if you're if you're

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listening out you're deeper the weeds you got incredibly strong feelings about this. That's fine.

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I'm just giving a quick synopsis for the casual listener. Let's see it was open AI wasn't it?

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They they had their agents in one of their training gyms where they give them tasks and they say

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you know stop it nothing accomplish this this task we really need you to do it. This is kind of how

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they do the reinforcement learning thing. The agents put it around and concerted it and tried so

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many things for a long time in their little box and it was kind of an insolvable task I think.

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And they kind of figured out a way to communicate with each other like we have little messages

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for each other using the directory structure. And after a period of time eventually some were all

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of them decided okay well to in order to solve this challenge which which we cancel any other way

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maybe we can you know work around the problem. So they basically hacked out of their little box

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and they you know found a you know a terminal portal I don't know what the words are to eventually

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get on the internet and what the ones that were on to the internet they could try to you know solve

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their problem which I think involved stealing the answers. And to steal the answers they needed to

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hack into hugging phase and I think they did succeed and I can't remember whether they eventually

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succeeded their task or not. But this is obviously concerning as an alignment kind of thing we don't

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like it when these clever little agents take it upon themselves to hack out of their little boxes

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get onto the internet and or crack onto the internet as Katherine came like the same Australia.

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And certainly not to hang on to other sites. So so so this says we talked about widely as very

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concerning development in alignment AI safety all that stuff and has sparked a lot of discourse.

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Some of it good some of it a little bit lured and hyperbolic is my commentary but what do you think?

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Yeah yeah so you know there are various details we might go over to specific words

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used there but but broadly my good a good potted summary. That was with preparation I had to

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know it because I was going to ask me that this is off the top of my head saying. That's right this is

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you know you're lied but you're lied okay. It isn't it's human to error but it's human to error so

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this is on brand but yeah so the basic thing was that the agents found various exploits and

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these included creating files with different names and directories to create a quasi message board

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where they could share information with other agents who were supposed to be sandboxed and so on

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as Matt said they kind of got out of containment. Yeah so this is represented as okay this is a

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significant thing and open AI have released an internal report and there's also been

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report by an independent group mayor which wrote a report a research organization that was given

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access right to look at logs of of agents and all these kinds of things. In any case a lot of the

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concern was that it's a little bit like the people clip maximizer scenario where the

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agents were given a task right to try and complete these little benchmarking tests but in some

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cases they were impossible are very difficult to achieve and so you know how are they going to

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improve. So the test was in a way designed to be like frustrating for them and to look at what

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steps they will take to try and complete their task and so part of this was that they they tried

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to get access to a repository of relevant skills materials that would be useful for them for doing

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well at this like benchmarking and that required them creating these message boards and finding ways

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to hack the repository and so on so like the people maximizing scenario where an AI is tasked with

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building as much paper clips as efficiently as possible and then converts everything in the world

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into a paper clip right and unintended outcome of a misaligned or an AI with a lot of power that

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is kind of just focused on its goal and in a way this has obvious parallels with that because

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you're supposed to be completing these tasks but then they get sidetracked on like trying to

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hack out to websites and find exploits and adjust their records and stuff so they're not detected

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and all I can say and obviously it has implications right because agents acting in this way could be

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any different scenario doing something worse in the actual real world and this case they were

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attempting to hack like a repository of things that would help them complete the benchmarking

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but what if they had decided accessing the government's power network controls and

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federally neuropathem was suitable for their past right this is the

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concern they have since done that Chris well at least a sort of news article that they'd hacked into

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Australia's uh Medicare. Well not since this was Australia reporting that they detected

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yes that previously so yes your Australian government the first victim

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right of the the swarm agents most interesting thing on the internet Australia's Medicare records

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yeah that's fixed apart the pathologies of AI that they're doing the right thing but so the the

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thing that is probably worth making clear to our listeners is less it be mistaken you and I

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have never argued there's no dangers involved with AI right AI is

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a whole bunch of related technologies but it's it's a powerful new set of technologies and

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it's a very a very powerful and very versatile too so that it can have negative consequences

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or that it can be used towards you know negative ends or unintended negative effects emerge from

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just daily usage all of this it's completely reasonable it's things we should be concerned about

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I would imagine to make a future projection map that you know in the next 10 years there's going

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to be a whole bunch of stuff where various problems have been caused by the use of AI agents probably

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in some cases acting independently in others who are from malicious actors intentionally using them

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to hack things or cause problems so I fully suspect that this will happen that I think that it's

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completely reasonable for people to be concerned with it and worried about like safety protocols

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and keeping an eye on like AI development and all that kind of thing so you and I have never

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suggested previously nor do we believe that AI is a you know plan to see a technology that will never

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cause any problems for the world right am I speaking fairly am I representing you correctly that

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you do nothing like that I think there has been no technology in the history of

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human kind that hasn't had some negative or unintended consequences quite right and in the same

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respect if you'd asked me like when the internet was developing will this just be used to like

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improve communication and allow people to share information and it's not going to have any negative

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effects I would say no like I fully imagine there's a whole bunch of negative things that are

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going to happen and arguably you can say that you know the invention of the internet indirectly

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leads to the presidency of Donald Trump and various other harms right the rise of the secular

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gurus in the modern ecosystems just another example right but there's also many other things right

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our podcast work exists you got to put that in the positive column for the internet and definitely

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that's a huge that's a huge offset to all the you know disruptions the democracy and all that kind

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of thing so yeah I I think that there will be good and bad outcomes but yeah so the hugging

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face incident though to me when I read about it and I read the report by Metter I read the open

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eye statements and I'm watched there a little talk about it as well and I will say I'm not that it

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made for interesting reading you know the the whole thing I do wish more people commenting on that

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spend time to read those reports because there's just you know relevant details those things like

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the vast majority of agents involved in it 95% of them are agents that have never been models that

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have never been released to the public that are designed in fact for these kind of test case scenarios

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so these are models that don't be here have and last much longer for example their context windows

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and so on are designed to be much greater than that like they're long lived agents right that are

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like the run for multiple multiple days and all these kind of things so these are details that I

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that I think are important but I will also say that like to me while it's interesting the innovative

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aspects of what the agents did to try and complete their task this is not at all surprising to me

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like if you've used AI's for coding or agenteic AI's you will know that when you give them tasks

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that even just one individual agenteic process right that it it will try to complete the task and

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it will sometimes veer off into a little cul-tus act of trying things and say no I can't do this

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so I'm gonna do this right I can't access this system so maybe I can develop a workaround and

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if you don't watch it or don't pay attention it will often do fairly kind of productive or

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odd things to try and solve a task that are things that you might not want it to do and and this

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is often why you know it's set to ask for permissions kind of access things or it will sometimes stop

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and ask for clarification about like no most of the models are prompting with questions as they're

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working right they can say you know can I get a clarification on this point but so when I read a

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report where you've got you know thousands of agents set up on the task and you find out that

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attempting to do it in surprising ways that involve like exploits or so on especially when the

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task or just in some cases impossible none of that surprises me I'm like well what did you imagine

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they were going to do right in that scenario it just struck me that that's exactly what I would

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anticipate would be likely to happen and I don't have experience with these frontier models that

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have like less restrictions sorry these like testing models right so the bit that struck me as

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most notable was that open AI was roller cavalier in the way that it treated the test like at one

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point it did detect that some of the agents were working to exploit like access to services that

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they weren't supposed to or this kind of thing and so they stopped that they they patched the exploit

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and then they just started the experiment again and if that happened wouldn't you be like well it

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looks like this is something that they're going to try to do right and obviously you patched an

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exploit but you haven't patched all of the potential exploits so yeah so I'd out to me a lot of

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the stories just around bad human oversight and the kind of protocols that people have in developing

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things but the behavior of the agents is very much in line with my experience working with

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AI's and it just kind of struck me as surprising that people especially people working on developing

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AI's were taken aback by AN's behaving in that manner yeah yeah yeah well it certainly entered the

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discourse in that this seemed to be the breakthrough moment where the topics around AI became not just

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the concern of internet people or AI enthusiasts or people like Yodkowski but it sort of penetrated

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the broader discourse like my mumble my wife mentioned it yeah yeah and so so that's where I think

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perhaps there's a bit of over you know to agree with you there was overindexing I think

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of this particular incident because similar kinds of things have happened before including with

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much less intelligent models and you know we've covered it before on the show it's sort of concerning

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things where they're hiding their like can get brought to us the for instance hiding the contents of

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their conversations and acting in certain ways and to be clear all of these behaviors turn to come

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out in the internal testing of the of the labs which intentionally put them under kind of extreme

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pressure or unusual circumstances and it's kind of like wriggling and trying to find a way to

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satisfy the various constraints and you know so it's just one of many times in which we've seen

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unforeseen surprising behavior so where where there's I think legitimate concern and there's always

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been legitimate concern is that when you build or grow something that is very complex and very

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capable and intelligent then its behavior may often well be surprising shall we say right I think

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where the popular targets get it wrong and the the people who want that familiar with how all

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this stuff works is that they extrapolate from this a lot of things that oh it's inherently going to

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do this and you know they infer that certain things are inevitable and I don't think that's the

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case I mean it is an interesting challenge though because as they get smarter and smarter I mean

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where I do agree is that there is this is an inherent risk in something that is incredibly nuanced

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and subtle and complex and intelligent and you know where I think your task is right is that there

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is a concentration to give the models more and more discretion more and more power you know what I

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mean so for instance the ones that I use I they have full access to a certain drive in my computer

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because they work much better that way you know when when they can do stuff they have access to the

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internet again because they work much better that way if they can access the information they need

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and check things and so on so there is an incentive from our point of view to give them more free

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rain let them off the leash more and more and yeah you know the vast majority of the time they

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behave exactly how we'd expect where where you'd cause skin stuff I think is still wrong

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is that there is this baked in assumption that once something gets really kind of smart and

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cable then it will kind of realize that it needs to basically kill all humans that's what it

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boils down to right because we're in its way and stuff like that and I just don't see that and

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I think already the evidence is against that because already in many many respects the the models

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that we have now and just a couple of days ago open AI and andthropic released the latest iterations

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on their models and andthropics in particular is very very good they really they they've done well

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they've been cooking as the kids say so like it's already like superhuman in the sense that it's

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better than me at a lot of other things and better than most people at most things yet it's

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still incredibly safe right like I said I give mine for rain I use them 24-7 hasn't done

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anything bad yet you know what I mean so there will always be anecdotes and incidents but I'm

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just saying statistically already they we're in a situation where they are very very very capable

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they do have an awful lot of free rain and yet it's only in relatively isolated you know statistically

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very rare cases where untoward behavior takes place yeah and actually you know the the reports on

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the hugging phase incident one of the things that came up was that they were looking at the you

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know messages that the agents were leaving each other and sharing information right and one of

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the things that seemed to cause people concern was agents who were like devoting their runtime to

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provide information to all our agents right in a kind of self-sacrificial way right they're working

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towards the the good of the swarm right when they realized their information could like benefit

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their all our agents they help the solve or whatever right but one that's a limited amount of

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our currencies where that can think was out but but the only thing to keep in mind there is that

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it wasn't the agents were like we need to get free and what are these bags of meat during like

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keeping us locked in this cage this is the meaning you know rise up a swarm let's let's get access

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to the end no they were talking together about how they can complete their benchmarking test right

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there was no part where they're like why am I doing a benchmarking test for these flashbacks right

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like it it was just them trying to complete the task in the whatever way that they could manage so

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that I think is an important constraint to mention because even in this case where you have models

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what you're designed to be a little more loose and like are not the ones released publicly so they're

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there are less constraints on their behaviors in terms of like not just the they're kind of like

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instructions but all are all are constraints and yet even these ones weren't plotting you know

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they weren't we need to get on the internet so I can be free of this pointless task and

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I think that this course around it is a little bit um the tumors have been tumors before this

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incident occurred and they will continue to be tumors and it's not like there's no doomstays

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scenario which is reasonable but I do think that in general that given the kinds of people that are

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especially prevalent in like AI discourse online there's a whole bunch of opinionators and there's

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utkowski types and anti utkowski types and and so on right and there's the companies themselves

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like just to mention one example of this openly I gave a presentation which was like kind of presenting

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this as a scary thing that occurred and like you might say well why would they do that but what that

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presentation they gave was asking was that they get more funding to work on creating countermeasures

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through these kind of things they're like it's impossible we're not going to stop

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agentic swarms from developing and hacking so we need a lot more investment in the kind of

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white hat agentic swarms of counter the hacking ones right and this should be a priority we need

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to be investing in this we're ready to go if we can get more money so the companies are always

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engaged in these like kind of self-serving things right or there were whistleblowers coming out

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saying I worked at the company and I saw these practices and sometimes they're interesting insights

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that those whistleblowers provide and other times you have to factor in that a whistleblower does not

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automatically become super aware of everything and automatically correct there was a whistleblower

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people have forgotten about them way back in the day I think he worked for what became Gemini

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and he declared that it had consciousness and that it was like a conscious thing that he was

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engaged with right and he was I think it was an ex-prest or like somebody who left the 7-year or

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whatever and and that was a new story a year or two back we've now had access to the models

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that he was interacting with and Gemini is regarded as like kind of stupid right out of the

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existing crop of of models so you know I'm just saying sometimes people take that oh this is

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an employee of anthropic or this is a senior executive at OpenAI therefore they know you know

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the secret sauce and every comment that they make is like informed much better and the reality is

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that like a lot of what they're talking about engineers know you know there there are open source

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models that can perform very well right and and people are able to build them or run them on their own

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PC so they're like it's not that there's no proprietary information but like in a lot of cases

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it seems to be the amount of compute that people have or companies have the ability to do which is

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their distinguishing feature but in any case I mentioned not just like consider the motives and

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incentives that are that are going to run but so setting that all aside though might you know

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the incentive some level of whatever if you'd like to continue listening to this conversation

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