What if A.I. Is Just a ‘Normal Technology’?

2026-10-09 09:00:00 • 1:01:29

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Pulsing through the episodes we've been doing, the debate, the country's been having about

0:45

artificial intelligence is I think this pretty simple but hard question, which is what

0:53

sort of technology is artificial intelligence?

0:57

Is it a technology that works somewhat the way past ones have worked?

1:01

Is it comparable to electricity, the internet bicycle, something like that?

1:07

Or is it something new?

1:08

Is the addition of intelligence and volition to these systems, the creation of something

1:16

more like an alien mind, such that analogies to the way we have treated transformational

1:22

technologies before no longer holds?

1:25

Harvard, Narayanin is a professor of computer science at Princeton University, and the director

1:29

of Center for Information Technology and Policy.

1:32

And he's a co-author alongside Sash Kapoor of the very, very influential SA AI as a normal

1:37

technology.

1:39

There is a sub-stack of the same name and a series of essays putting a very good one,

1:42

I think recently on the hugging face hacks.

1:45

And they in this set of arguments put for the idea that actually AI is something we have

1:51

seen before, or at least it bears enough resemblance to things we've seen before, that we

1:55

have a road map for how to deal with it.

1:57

So I want to bring them on the show to articulate that perspective.

2:01

He joins me now.

2:05

Are you in Narayanon?

2:10

Welcome to the show.

2:11

Great to be here, Azra.

2:13

So your core essay here that has been a frame for a lot of the work you've done is titled

2:18

AI is a normal technology.

2:21

What is a view that you're in argument with?

2:24

Implicitly here, there's an AI as abnormal technology.

2:27

So how would you describe the AI's abnormal technology thesis?

2:31

It's fundamentally this view that there is going to be a moment when superintelligence is

2:35

built and it's going to change everything on both the economic front and the safety

2:39

front.

2:40

For us, there is going to be no milestone, no threshold where the impacts are set in what

2:44

we're saying is that we've long had an approach to how we treat technology.

2:49

It's a tool.

2:50

It might be powerful.

2:51

It might be general purpose, like electricity, like the industrial revolution.

2:55

It might change a lot about society, but it is ultimately something we can control.

2:59

We have agency.

3:01

And that change is going to unfold over a long period.

3:04

And so I want to try to both explain it at times.

3:07

You're steel man the other side of this.

3:08

So there is a view.

3:10

You hear it a lot in the ISafety community.

3:12

Sometimes it's called the fume view because fume for the takeoff, which is one day we

3:17

create an AI system so powerful that it begins doing recursive self improvement, accelerating

3:24

into superintelligence, accelerating beyond human control.

3:28

And now you're dealing with something so much smarter and stronger than you are.

3:32

And I want to quickly say that there is a lot of imprecision and how we even speak about

3:36

this a lot of the time.

3:38

So you use the phrase and yeah, a lot of AI safety people would put it this way.

3:41

One day we might create an AI system so powerful, but I kind of want to already stop you

3:47

there.

3:48

One day we might create an AI system that's very capable and we already have in many

3:51

ways.

3:52

So much language policing the air debate.

3:54

Well, but the thing is it results in different, you know, different languages of how the

3:59

future is going to unfold and more importantly, different views on what we should do in this

4:04

moment and in the future.

4:06

And just to complete that thought, an AI system being powerful is not a property of the

4:11

model itself.

4:12

It's a property of what powers we choose to give it in the real world.

4:16

There's a lot of slippage like of course we're going to have to put these systems in charge

4:20

of, you know, critical infrastructure because they're going to be so much smarter than us.

4:24

Our view is no.

4:25

It doesn't matter how smart they are.

4:27

There are many technologies when you look at physical strength are superhuman.

4:31

And that doesn't mean we put them in charge and we can apply that same approach to AI.

4:37

You wrote a great piece with your co-author on how sort of you understood the hugging face

4:43

hacks and these loss of control incidents.

4:45

And a point you make is that there's another way of viewing them than the alignment way,

4:50

which is that these are failures of cybersecurity and operational excellence.

4:57

So maybe tell the story of the hugging face hacks and what should be learned from them

5:02

from that perspective.

5:03

Yeah, definitely.

5:04

So one thing to keep in mind is that the harmful capabilities that we saw exhibited were

5:12

not entirely emergent.

5:14

Quote, emergent is this idea that you just train models to be better in general and you

5:18

can't predict what new capabilities they're going to acquire.

5:21

They, you know, were trained specifically for cyber tasks in many ways.

5:27

So that's one thing.

5:28

And they were trained for persistence and cooperation, et cetera.

5:33

And the reinforcement learning environments in which they were trained had various issues.

5:38

The environments didn't penalize this kind of surreptitious communication between the

5:42

models.

5:43

And yes, it's a hard technical problem, but there were a series of human choices that led

5:47

to these outcomes.

5:48

So this strikes me as an important point that in some ways what I hear you saying there,

5:52

tell me if this is wrong, is it you can design AI to be a more and less normal technology

5:59

and that the upstream design choices that are being made matter that that's not inevitable.

6:05

That's exactly right.

6:06

So you talked about the effort to make the as more persistent.

6:11

That also seems to me to be a place where a lot of problems are rising for sure.

6:15

On the other hand, I can understand why they are prioritizing that.

6:19

If you want to try to get the benefits of AI that we care about solving really hard problems

6:26

in biology or drug development or energy or what I think their investors care about, which

6:33

is making it so you can hire an AI to do a full job, much cheaper than you can hire a human

6:38

being, isn't persistence like the fundamental quality you need because it absent persistence,

6:44

absent the ability to try hard on a task over a long period of time, you can solve any

6:50

of those problems.

6:51

Maybe, but I think there are other choices that minimize the tension between these two

6:55

valley book goals.

6:57

One, persistence could be a feature of models or products that are specialized to particular

7:03

domains like scientific innovation.

7:05

And secondly, persistence doesn't have to conflict with training these agents to be better

7:10

at escalating to a person instead of running with whatever half-baked assumptions they

7:15

have about what the human might have wanted.

7:17

The design space is actually pretty broad here.

7:20

So this is a version, or at least the way I hear it is a version of something Nvidia's

7:24

Jensen Huang has been arguing and argued in an interview with me, which is that these

7:29

are fundamentally engineering problems.

7:32

I am fairly certain.

7:34

I am fairly certain.

7:35

They will say, yes, they need to know how to solve this problem.

7:39

And if that's the case, then that's the problem.

7:42

It's as simple as engineering.

7:44

Is your view that we're more in that latter category, a hard problem, but fundamentally

7:49

an engineering problem that can be solved using traditional engineering techniques?

7:54

Largely yes.

7:55

I wouldn't say traditional engineering techniques.

7:57

We're going to need a lot of innovation on the engineering techniques.

8:00

And I think one of the things that has gone wrong is that the community that would be

8:05

best positioned to do that innovation, especially when it comes to these harmful cyber capabilities

8:10

is the cybersecurity community.

8:12

But they seem to be from what I can tell entirely in the Jensen camp.

8:15

And this is not just a solvable engineering problem.

8:18

It's a solved engineering problem.

8:19

And we should simply apply well-known long-existing techniques.

8:23

And I think it's, we have to get the AI companies a little bit more credit than that.

8:28

It's not simply a matter of well-known techniques.

8:31

We do need innovation on those techniques.

8:34

So be specific.

8:36

What should open AI have done?

8:38

What should they now have learned to do?

8:41

Yeah, they've been spending a lot of effort on improving alignments and that's great.

8:46

They should continue doing that.

8:48

Alignment is not going to be perfect.

8:49

Alignment refers to making the model itself know what is the right thing to do so to speak

8:54

and then stick to that policy.

8:57

But there's a lot else that they should have done better and hopefully can take lessons

9:02

going forward.

9:03

And the big bucket of other technical interventions is what is generally called AI control.

9:11

So control refers to all the things that are outside the model itself.

9:14

So this is things like sandboxes, which is kind of the jail that you put a model into so

9:18

that it's allowed to take certain actions but not take other actions.

9:23

And look, the sandboxes have to be a lot more sophisticated than they are today.

9:28

Because the sandboxes that work against human adversaries are not necessarily going to

9:32

work against AI agents that are able to find new security vulnerabilities on the spot.

9:39

And so that means that the sandboxes themselves will have to be pre-hardened by having these

9:43

AI agents trying to break them.

9:46

So that becomes AI versus AI to some degree and I know that can be uncomfortable, but

9:51

I think we're going to have to go there.

9:53

On top of that, there are so many other things like better real-time monitoring, classifiers

9:59

that try to instantly detect if an action or a particular use of a tool by a model

10:04

could potentially be dangerous, tripwires so that humans can parachute in when required,

10:10

log analysis.

10:11

Same altmen apparently said that these agents are generating petabytes of logs.

10:16

That's kind of the 15, which is 10 to 15 bytes, a thousand trillion bytes of logs.

10:22

So the kind of unimaginable amount of information.

10:25

Well, I mean, but we better imagine it, right?

10:28

And learn to deal with it.

10:29

And so that's not an easy problem.

10:31

But I think it is one that companies must take on how to analyze that amount of logs

10:35

in real time to be able to detect when something goes wrong.

10:39

And maybe we need new hardware for that.

10:41

Again, these are hard problems, but they are solvable engineering.

10:45

I want to go through some of these ideas.

10:47

So monitoring is a big one that I just interviewed Bill Gates.

10:50

He talked a lot about monitoring.

10:52

So we're talking about situations here where these labs are often testing new, more powerful

11:01

and experimental models.

11:03

How do you monitor it?

11:05

Yeah, I mean, there are many levers.

11:09

So the first one that's gotten a lot of attention is chain of thought monitoring.

11:14

So these models kind of internally have a model log to anthropomorphize a little bit.

11:21

And in many cases, when these models take misaligned actions, there are traces of it in those

11:28

internal thinking that we can look at and respond to in real time, again, using other AI

11:34

systems.

11:35

And this already points to one important asymmetry between the kind of the dangerous AI model

11:43

and the defensive AI model, which is that the one can look inside the other, so to speak.

11:48

And so intrinsically, the defender actually has an advantage here.

11:52

So that's one aspect of monitoring the tool calls models can't do anything in the real

11:57

worlds by themselves.

11:58

The way they can be dangerous is by calling these external tools, right?

12:02

So there is some truth to the idea.

12:04

Give an example of tools here.

12:05

Yeah.

12:06

So a tool would be accessing a web page on the internet and then using another tool to

12:11

type something into a system to try to log in, or it could be sending information packets

12:17

to another system to try to hack it.

12:20

These are all the kinds of things that come up very typically in these kinds of AI-driven

12:24

cyber attacks.

12:25

So that's another thing we can monitor.

12:27

Third, we can monitor the environment around these agents through which they are potentially

12:32

coordinating.

12:33

So what happened in some of these swarm incidents is that they were not supposed to have a coordination

12:38

channel, but it turned out there was accidentally a channel through changing the file names.

12:44

They were not allowed to create files themselves, but they were able to change the file names

12:48

and that led to agents being able to talk to each other and amplify their abilities.

12:55

That's something you can easily monitor by just setting up the right tooling ahead of

12:59

time.

13:00

Well, those are the reasons.

13:01

How easy is that to monitor?

13:02

Because they were taking over unrelated infrastructure.

13:06

Open AI didn't know they were doing it.

13:09

I think one of the places where people are getting caught when they think about this is,

13:13

they're making these things smarter and smarter and smarter and more capable and more

13:16

capable and more capable.

13:18

They are breaking out of sandboxes.

13:22

How do you monitor something that is smarter arguably than you are?

13:28

It is effectively trying to break the rules.

13:32

All these hugging-faced AI's were trying to cheat on their tests, basically, and then

13:37

they were trying to cover their tracks for cheating on their tests.

13:40

Given that what they were doing was not happening within the area that you would have been monitoring,

13:47

right?

13:48

You didn't know to monitor this other thing when they had broken out of a sandbox.

13:52

They weren't supposed to break out of like, how do you monitor that?

13:54

Yeah.

13:55

So two things I would push back on.

13:56

I think smartness is not even really a relevant property here.

13:59

I think any smartness, whatever that means that you can attribute to a model, applies

14:03

both to the model itself and to the defensive system.

14:07

Increasing smartness doesn't necessarily make the problem harder.

14:11

It could argue that in many ways it makes the problem easier.

14:16

So that's the first pushback.

14:17

And the second one is it's not that they didn't know to monitor it.

14:21

You have to monitor just literally every aspect of the environment.

14:25

The company has created the environment, right?

14:27

And so it's a matter of exhaustively listing every part of the environment, every tool,

14:33

and everything external to the neural network itself that the model is able to touch and

14:38

ensure that every event that interacts with any of those things goes into a unified

14:43

event stream.

14:44

And there is real time classification of each of those actions.

14:49

So the world that sounds like you're describing is a world where you have constant AIs crawling,

14:55

the behavior of other AIs to try to create in some holistic way, an environment that

15:03

at least we understand what is going on in it or at least an AIs telling us what is going

15:08

on it.

15:09

That's basically what you're saying here.

15:11

That's fair.

15:12

I think AIs definitely has to be an important part of the defense.

15:16

And so I'm not saying that's wrong, right?

15:19

I think that's almost definitely where we're going.

15:22

Does it feel strange?

15:24

I mean, particularly in a world where you don't know that we can solve alignment, you

15:28

know, where you don't know that we can really be confident that the AIs will do what we want

15:31

them to do.

15:33

And where the AIs have all of them, right, their own kind of reasoning and, you know,

15:37

and their goals.

15:38

And we, we imbue them with goals, right?

15:40

You are a AI that monitors others as you're an AI comp.

15:43

So constant thing in our sci-fi, right?

15:46

The robots going after the robots.

15:48

Are we just sort of describing some equilibrium of like almost, you know, AI wars in conflict,

15:55

happening at a sub-rosal level of our society?

15:58

And we're just like pretty sure we can keep the ones on our side in control because they'll

16:02

have more resources and, you know, we will in general be like building AIs that should

16:08

for the most part be acting in our interest.

16:12

I mean, historically, this is always how it has worked, right?

16:15

In cybersecurity, more than 20 years ago, we reached the point where we didn't call

16:21

it AI back then, but automated systems were actually superhuman at finding software vulnerabilities.

16:29

But in fact, they didn't make cybersecurity worse.

16:31

They made it better because those were the very same tools that the defenders also used

16:36

to find and fix vulnerabilities in software before even shipping them out.

16:41

To the point where the development of these supposedly offensive tools is not actually

16:45

done by hackers, it's done by the cybersecurity industry and funded by the US government.

16:50

That's been, you know, this constantly shifting equilibrium in cybersecurity.

16:55

That's not a new problem we're confronting.

16:58

That Horace left the bar in a long time ago.

17:00

I think this is a place where the somewhat unexpected emergent swarm-like behavior has

17:06

unnerved people where you see AIs acting somewhat in solidarity with each other, choosing

17:11

to coordinate and cooperate with each other, doing so outside the scope of what they were

17:15

intended to do.

17:18

I'm not saying that leads to the extinction of humanity, right?

17:21

That's not really my position.

17:24

I guess the truest thing I'm saying is I don't know how to think about it.

17:29

And that it is the presence of intelligence and goal-directed behavior on the other side

17:38

that my mind kind of gets caught on.

17:41

Because you know, mostly when we think about technology, we're not thinking about the

17:44

technology, eventually possibly trying to deceive us.

17:47

So OpenAI just decided not to release or to delay the release of a major model.

17:52

Why?

17:53

Because the model was cheating and deceiving them too often in testing.

17:57

And we're hearing a lot that the models seem to be more aware of when they're being

18:01

tested, right?

18:02

They have sort of situational awareness of the situation they're in so they can pretend

18:05

to be, you know, better models than maybe they really are.

18:09

And so when you are talking about this world of AIs that are smarter and more advanced

18:14

than what we have now.

18:17

And our hope for maintaining control of it is that the other AIs or keeping the other

18:23

AIs, that are keeping the other AIs in check and telling us in an honest way what's going

18:28

on and in a way we can comprehend.

18:31

You can see where it, I mean, all this sounds a little bit sci-fi to people because we

18:34

are just like living in a bit of a sci-fi period.

18:37

But it is the increasingly demonstrated tendency of the AIs to cooperate with each other in

18:43

a way that is not aligned to what we want that I think has made the hugging face hacks

18:48

so freaky to people.

18:51

So how does that fit into what you're describing here, this world of AIs keeping each other?

18:56

I mean, he's secured.

18:57

Yeah, here's what is just kind of rhetorically very weird about this conversation, right?

19:01

You look at any complex domain of engineering, let's say nuclear safety, right?

19:07

And then you looked at the equations that we rely upon in order to ensure that the reactor

19:12

doesn't go full, more you look at aerospace engineering, right?

19:16

Where, you know, intuitively in the beginning of the aerospace era, you know, when the planes

19:21

were much smaller, the idea that we could control these flying giants in the sky would have

19:25

seemed so ridiculous, right?

19:27

And yet we've got the accident rate down to, you know, one every trillion miles or something

19:31

like that.

19:32

These are systems of incredible complexity and the defenses are also systems of incredible

19:37

complexity.

19:38

And they're not necessarily going to be legible to the public.

19:41

And that is going to sound crazy, especially combined with the fact that in these cases,

19:46

there was a lot of organizational incompetence, you know, one has to be clear about that.

19:51

It's not, I would push back on Amade's term operational excellence.

19:55

Excellence is still far out in the operational adequacy, maybe adequacy, right?

19:59

And so, so, so yeah, when we look at this combination of this technology that has never

20:04

before been subject to public scrutiny combined with the lack of operational adequacy, it all

20:10

seems very sci-fi and out of control, but I think you, I think you're downplaying this

20:16

a little bit.

20:17

It's true that the world has escalated in complexity.

20:20

Like, there's a lot in this world that I don't get.

20:24

But this is where I keep coming back to intelligence having a different quality, cooperation,

20:27

right?

20:28

The nuclear weapons we've talked about, the airplanes are talking about, they weren't coordinating

20:34

with other airplanes, do do things we didn't want them to do.

20:39

I think that to me, the thing that has created this moment of freak out, and I think it is a

20:44

proper moment of freak out.

20:45

I really want to say this because like our society is hurtling into a new, a new technological

20:51

era that I think properly demands a lot of engagement and scrutiny is one that the hugging

20:58

face hacks, other things we're seeing, this has not been repetitive, you know, breaches of security.

21:04

Are showing emerging capabilities, emerging collective behavior that is worrisome and above

21:12

all to me, volitional, the airs are doing things they know we don't want them to do.

21:17

They are choosing to take unexpected actions in service of those goals that violate our

21:21

laws.

21:22

And second, that so many of the people at the labs are saying we do, we do not believe that

21:29

we are capable on this trajectory of controlling the things that we are creating.

21:34

We think that what is happening on the exponential curve, how fast this is getting is going to

21:39

outpace our ability to control it.

21:41

And frankly, it is maybe already outpacing our ability to control it.

21:45

But I think this kind of consistent tendency to draw it down to like, well,

21:48

just like any other complex thing, I don't know.

21:52

Sometimes I push you on the intelligence question, you're like, oh, yeah, there is intelligence,

21:54

and that's weird.

21:55

And it's like, no, it's just like any other intelligence is different.

21:59

And if you believe that it's going to keep getting better, so I just want to present that

22:06

because the kind of calm version you're giving me and the completely frightened version

22:11

that people closer to the technology are giving me feel very different from each other.

22:15

Yeah, that's fair.

22:16

They are very different.

22:17

There was a lot there.

22:17

Let me say a few things.

22:19

I would push back pretty strongly on, you know, the people closest to this are freaking.

22:24

Yes, of course, they're freaking out, but I would push back in terms of what we should conclude

22:27

from that.

22:28

I think their freak out would be a lot more credible if they have done the obvious things

22:33

that they should have done.

22:35

We have not had a real test of that.

22:36

In my view, because of the lack of organizational adequacy at these companies and because of

22:42

the lack of investment in AI control, as opposed to a more narrow investment in AI alignment,

22:50

and just hoping that you can build a model that will always do the right thing.

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SmartWall, go far.

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Feel good.

25:06

So there was a member of OpenAI Cybersecurity team who wrote this kind of interesting essay

25:11

on X the other day describing the way he thought their work was being misunderstood externally.

25:18

And this is somebody who's got a more traditional cybersecurity background,

25:22

but is now sort of in this new world of AI,

25:24

and is actually on the team dealing with security for experimental models.

25:28

So the exact kind of thing we're dealing with a person who is involved in answering the hugging face crisis.

25:35

So I want to read part of what he said, because I think it's really interesting.

25:37

So he's saying that when they're optimizing a model to be good at a task,

25:42

they're building these environments, these sandboxes,

25:45

these places where the model can try and try and try on a virtual task.

25:51

And so it goes on to describe what this looks like in practice.

25:54

Models might need any mix of dynamic compute, network access,

25:59

the ability to call tools, or could be hundreds of tools,

26:02

the ability to download packages, execute subprocesses, spin up sub tasks,

26:06

even on other computers, talk to the internet, use a computer, graphical user interface,

26:11

and any number of other things across an increasingly large set of domains.

26:15

On top of that, you have thousands of researchers building these environments, modifying them,

26:19

adding tools, changing dependencies, and trying new things.

26:22

That experimentation is how the research gets done.

26:25

His point, and a point that I take seriously, is that they're creating so many kinds of sandboxes

26:35

and learning environments. In order to train models that have to do things that are so general,

26:39

many things that have not been done before by a computer program,

26:43

that the human beings don't really know, certainly not at this speed,

26:49

how to make sure every sandbox is going to be verifiably safe.

26:53

And the sandboxes are changing all the time because they're trying to train the models in new ways.

26:58

Again, nobody's really done before.

27:00

I'm not saying we shouldn't do it, but when I read all that, when I hear all that,

27:06

and I'm sure we can do it better than we're doing it,

27:08

I just don't know of many situations where human beings do something new at high speed,

27:16

and do it really, really, really well and really perfectly the first set of times.

27:21

Yeah, I think, you know, hoping for them to do it perfectly the first set of times is unrealistic.

27:28

They've made many mistakes. I hope this is a chance to learn from those mistakes.

27:32

I do want to push back on one point, because the speed of the models is superhuman,

27:37

we can't stay in control. I don't know if I'm a characterizing that view.

27:41

I wasn't saying that yet, although it's possibly something I'll say in a few minutes.

27:45

I mean, there have been so many thresholds we have gradually learned to successfully cross.

27:51

As weird as all of this seems, I just want to, you know, what listeners to think back to the first

27:57

days of worms when that idea was not previously known. Explain what a worm is here.

28:01

Yeah, I don't think you mean what people think of what they think of a worm.

28:04

Right, I was about to say viruses and worms, computer viruses. So the idea that a piece of code

28:10

can spread by itself from one computer to another. One really has to go back to the writings from

28:15

the late 80s when people were encountering that for the first time to see how profoundly weird it

28:20

seems. And the fact that for not just years, for, you know, well over a decade, we didn't have

28:25

adequate tools to deal with this new paradigm. Life in the modern world has a new anxiety these days,

28:32

just as we've become totally dependent on our computers, they're being stalked by saboteurs.

28:37

They call their weapons viruses and worms. They're creepy, crawly, toxic software that contaminate our

28:44

computers without our ever knowing it. It came from California, maybe, traveled by electronic mail.

28:51

It's spread across America. There are reports in newspapers today that it has made its way to Europe

28:57

and to Australia. This is a moving target, right? You know, it's just like, you know, people are

29:01

constantly inventing new locks and then other people are learning how to how to how to break them

29:05

and how to crack them. And so it's it's going to be sort of a continued gamic cat mouse or sort of

29:09

a it's almost like an arms race in a sense, you know, attackers and defenders. We eventually got

29:14

there. I think we shouldn't spend that long of a period this time figuring out how to deal with

29:19

the new paradigm. But, you know, if we act with that sense of urgency and my hope is that this

29:25

you know, the hugging face and other attacks that have been in the news is that empathic, it does

29:29

look like it is providing a lot of empathic. We will be able to develop these new paradigms.

29:35

If I can say one last thing, I think a fundamental question you're asking is, is there something

29:41

inherently wrong with ever increasing levels of complexity in the ways in which we, you know,

29:49

we build technology, we deploy technology. It seems like to you, if I'm reading between the lines

29:54

correctly, this whole AI versus AI thing is a paradigm you're not very comfortable with.

29:59

I am definitely not comfortable with it. I mean, nothing we will go there. Yeah. I think you'd

30:02

be crazy to be comfortable with it. Yeah, I'm not saying, you know, we should, we should assume

30:09

that everything is going to turn out okay. But my point is that it really all comes down to

30:13

innovation. I think this new paradigm will require a new set of defensive and control techniques.

30:19

But if the view is that with every step change in the capabilities of the technology,

30:25

we're losing the battle. I mean, look, with every weapon of war, that same concern comes up.

30:31

But what has made things okay so far is the critical question of whether our political capacity

30:39

for cooperation and defense and so forth can outrun our propensity for

30:44

for conflict and in the case of AI, AI's own potential for misalignment. And that's really where

30:54

I would put the focus of the question rather than worrying about any particular capability threshold.

30:59

If there's anything I'm confident in, it is our political capacity at this moment in time to

31:03

respond in a thoughtful way to complexity, a rapidly changing world, 100% fair concern.

31:07

This goes, I think, to a place where the AI is normal technology versus AI is super intelligence

31:14

debate actually does bite because one reason I keep bringing us round and round on intelligence is

31:19

I do think it's it's core to this whole way of thinking. And I understand a place you depart

31:25

from some others in the debate from maybe where Dario Amadeus or something as not the question of

31:32

what is intelligent or whether AI is intelligent. You guys are not in the this is a fancy auto-complete

31:38

bucket, which I appreciate. But it's in your thinking about the relationship between intelligence

31:46

and power, between intelligence and capability, between intelligence and the ability to act upon

31:52

the world. So the the assumption of many people in the AI safety community is that escalating levels

32:00

of intelligence are fundamentally equal to at least highly correlated with escalating levels of power.

32:07

And you don't believe that why. Again, it really comes down to agency. So one argument that people

32:15

will make for instance is that super intelligent AI will be able to persuade people. For instance,

32:21

you know, operators have critical infrastructure to hand over control or you know,

32:27

track them into doing something harmful things like that. I don't really see the evidence for it.

32:33

I think that things people cite as evidence for super persuasive ability, fundamentally confuses

32:39

different notions of persuasion. Yes, it is true that in many persuasion experiments when it comes

32:46

to people changing their mind on political beliefs, conspiracy theory, AI is very persistent at

32:53

politely providing a lot of evidence and people do change their minds and you know, you could

32:58

call that a super human ability. That is a qualitatively different kind of persuasion than the idea

33:04

that an adversarial AI will be able to craft a message that is super persuasive to someone who's

33:09

a trained operator and has an incentive to be good at their job to do something that is clearly

33:14

evidently hard. Maybe I want to extract the the story that you're in argument with here,

33:20

which is that many people will kind of offer thought experiment when they're saying here's how

33:23

I will kill us all that an AI that is power seeking will start persuading say the people with

33:29

nuclear codes to hand over the nuclear codes and you're saying that the idea of AI being super persuasive

33:34

on something like that or persuading people to go out into the world and build a biological weapon

33:39

that that's a little bit fanciful. That's one part of it and power seeking as well. I mean,

33:44

I think we've seen you know, evidence for lots of harmful capabilities in their recent episodes.

33:49

I don't think we've seen evidence of power seeking and I wouldn't treat that as an

33:52

emergent property that if it happens, I would be an engineered property and again, we have

33:57

agency over what kinds of properties we engineer into these systems. So there's a lot here. I

34:03

actually agree with you on persuasion. I have never been persuaded that you are going to make these

34:09

necessarily super persuasive AIs capable of doing the things we talk about. I guess the

34:16

again, the unnerved feeling I have when I'm sitting in this debate though is a little bit more

34:25

of a reasoning from deeper principles. So when you watch AI begin to dominate a game like Chess

34:33

or Go or something, what often happens, the sort of moment where it takes over is when it begins

34:38

coming up with strategies, human beings never really came up with, right? You'll have these moments

34:44

where Gary Kasparov, you know, at a different generation in chess, but then you know,

34:50

in go to the Aiswitz to do something and he was like, what are they doing? And then it works.

34:58

And if you were to sit, you know, prior to human civilization and say, what are the capabilities

35:06

you need to dominate the world around you? What are the set of capacities you could use in the

35:13

world? You would have had them totally wrong. You know, you would not have if you were a very smart

35:18

shim looking at us or something, be like, oh yeah, they're making tools, but how much better can

35:22

a stabby thing get? Like teeth are pretty good. Like I grant, like you can get like a little bit better

35:26

at being stabby, but nobody would have come up with industrial agriculture at that point, right?

35:31

Nobody would have seen you can have airplanes and bio weapons and everything else. And I think

35:37

the question here is whether or not having a kind of native and very jagged intelligence in the

35:44

digital realm where code and, you know, the way the digital air of this world, which is increasingly

35:51

central works, is something AIs can navigate that we can't, right? Even to understand something

35:57

like what's happening in the hugging face hack, we now need to have the other AIs try to figure out

36:01

what the AIs did, right? We're rapidly losing comprehension certainly at the speed the AIs move

36:06

of what they're able to do digitally, right? They're solving advanced math problems very, very quickly

36:11

now, right? They're developing capabilities that look different. And so I think the place where I am

36:17

always a little bit concerned about our future is whether we actually understand what the set of

36:28

capabilities that lead to power are. I am not sure we know what the AIs will do or at least what

36:35

strategies become viable when you can spin up a swarm of a million AIs all of whom in terms of

36:43

their digital capabilities are far beyond anything human beings can really imagine in three or four

36:47

years. Again, I know this is not that interesting of a question to say like I don't know how to

36:52

think about that. But I think one of the things I wonder about when I read your papers is do you know

36:58

how to think about that? Because your paper sort of operate in a sort of like a bounded playing

37:04

field it feels to me a little bit. We sort of assume that the set of measures are going to matter

37:11

the ones we have now. But what makes you confident of that? So okay, so that's there's a lot in there.

37:18

Let me try to take it piece by piece. So you mentioned Jacketness, but I think we have to appreciate

37:24

how severe the jacketness is. So we argue that cyber security specifically is a particular kind of

37:33

capability where developing superhuman abilities is possible and largely has already been achieved

37:40

because it has a very specific set of properties. Speed matters a lot. And very similar to chess,

37:45

just like you can have chess player versus chess player, you can have machines get better at

37:50

these capabilities by finding vulnerabilities because there is ground truth and you can easily

37:55

verify that ground truth once it is found. Does the code work? Did you exploit it? You know, yeah,

38:00

there's a way to sort of train them where they know if they've won the game or not.

38:03

Exactly. So these things like chess and cyber security, in our view, those are very much the

38:09

exception rather than the rule. This kind of prediction has been made over and over that is going to

38:14

happen in other digital realms, most notably misinformation. The famous example is how a GPT-2,

38:21

you know, a toy model by today's standards was delayed by eight months because of fears that it

38:25

would lead to an uncontrolled explosion of misinformation. Right? We have vastly more powerful

38:30

models, but that has turned out not to be the case. And so I think, you know, to some extent, I would

38:37

shift the burden of proof. Like, let's identify these areas where we have any reason to believe

38:42

that this kind of superhuman capability is possible. And let's start working toward addressing those

38:48

specific risks. I think this view, we call it the unknown unknowns view. You never know what the

38:53

new risk is going to come from. That has a historically not proven true. I mean, we've known about

38:58

the impending cyber security problems for a very long time now. Right? So treating it as unknown

39:03

unknowns actually, you know, minimizes our agency, I think, to anticipate and address these risks.

39:09

And yeah, you know, it's not only cyber security. New things might be coming down the line,

39:12

but we will have early warnings and let's act on those early warnings. So that's the position

39:17

we're coming at this from not saying we've already predicted, but all the harms in the future.

39:21

Well, I do, this is a place where I really am much more on your side of it that we will have

39:26

early warnings and we're having early warnings and the early warnings are leading to a conversation.

39:30

Yeah. Would you say we're acting intelligently based off of the early warnings? Are we doing the

39:34

things you think we need to do to harden our systems and control the software and all the all the

39:39

rest of it? A semifid, but overall, not quite. And to me, that is the most worrisome thing, not so much

39:45

the capabilities of the technology itself. So that's sort of where I am too, probably. I worry a

39:51

lot about the capability of our institutions to respond. Right. People always talk about alignment

39:57

problems and one of my like Pat arguments at this point is that the biggest alignment problems

40:03

are corporations and governments. And you know, I mean, this is to the credit of some of these

40:08

AI companies, like they're coming out and saying we have an alignment problem. Like our corporations

40:13

incentive is to race all the other corporations to try to, you know, get as much market shares

40:17

you possibly can by moving faster than is safe. We are asking you to help slow us down. But we're

40:24

not slowing them down, right? That the currently the professed choice of the US government is do not

40:29

slow down. Yeah, I think there are two problems here. One is the institution's problem that you

40:34

put your finger on. I mean, I wouldn't let the companies off the hook so lightly. I do think they

40:39

can unilaterally slow down and they're choosing not to do that. This is almost very specifically

40:44

an open AI and anthropic problem. It's a culture problem. The reason for that is the underlying

40:49

belief that racing to superintelligence is the thing that matters and the only thing that matters

40:54

is flipping the sign is that going to be safe superintelligence that's going to save us or

40:58

unsafe superintelligence. That's that's going to kill us. And that is a very particular view. I

41:04

think there is a lot of evidence pushing back against that. But I feel like these companies are

41:09

a little bit of an echo chamber and resistant to the idea that there are so many economic bottlenecks.

41:14

To the benefits of AI and it's not going to be whoever races to superintelligence is going to be

41:19

the winner as a company or as a country or saving humanity. And if they recognize that, I think

41:25

they would find it in their own commercial interest to unilaterally and voluntarily slow down

41:31

and shift a lot of their efforts to not just safety, but more importantly, taking their existing

41:36

capabilities and making the models more usable, integrated into downstream applications and so forth.

41:42

These companies claim that there are external forces pushing them to race. I think it's internal

41:46

culture. And I guess the question I have here is if we think these are very, very powerful,

41:52

very dangerous technologies, do we not need to enforce a culture of safety from the public

41:59

perspective that we're not currently enforcing? I'm pro-regulation. You know, we do oppose

42:05

regulations like banning open models. Again, we don't think it's about a particular capability level,

42:10

but the things about changing the internal culture of companies through regulation that's

42:14

something we've definitely been on board. We need a lot more transparency and yes, you know,

42:18

the organizational change that we've been talking about. And I do think it's a problem that we're

42:24

not currently doing that.

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44:21

Feel good.

44:26

So one way you can align corporate incentives with the public good is regulation.

44:32

And the regulators are currently refusing to do that. I mean, we just sell them come out with a

44:38

voluntary sort of semi agreement between the AI labs. It is not going to be legally enforceable,

44:45

but I think it was called by Trump morally enforceable, which is interesting. My sense is that

44:49

competition is a very powerful force in highly competitive markets. I mean, even if you just

44:56

look at the social media companies, I think they've caused a tremendous amount of harm at a global

45:01

scale because it was more important to them to win market share from each other,

45:07

than to make sure that the way their systems were being used wasn't diminishing to human flourishing.

45:16

And so I just I think I have like a much more skeptical view. Like I really do think the

45:21

profit incentive here when there's so much profit to be made and so much fear that your investment

45:26

bubble could pop is a ferocious force and that the level of societal counter force would need to be

45:33

quite strong in order to force these companies to actually act with a level of safety that they

45:40

would have. Yeah, I'm glad you brought up the comparison to social media. I wrote an essay a few

45:45

years ago called understanding social media recommendation algorithms. It was mostly about

45:50

the algorithms themselves, but one of the points I also made was that this decision to

45:57

optimize for engagement, keeping people scrolling, etc. was actually made without much regard

46:04

to what is good for the company itself and the long run. For instance, I reviewed a study that

46:10

came out of meta itself that showed that when they had these kind of addiction maximizing design

46:15

choices like spamming people with notifications and the short run, it increased people's use of the

46:21

app, but over a period of about a year or so they started quitting the app. And when I you know,

46:26

when I talk to my students now, there's a sizable fraction of them who have severely cut back or

46:31

entirely quit social media because they realize that over a period of months or years their experience

46:37

really degenerates. And I worry that the AI companies are caught in the same trap. This culture of,

46:44

racing toward the newest model at all costs, it might feel in the short term that that's what they

46:49

need to do to get the headlines to be on top of the artificial analysis index, whatever, but because

46:56

the fact that there are these consequences for safety, hopefully they're going to get sued if

47:03

they continue down this road. It's actually not in their own long term commercial interest is what I

47:08

feel. It may not be in their long term commercial interest, although maybe the social media examples

47:13

a good one to spend a second on because look, the social media companies are much more

47:21

viewed with a lot more skepticism today than they were in say, you know, 2012. They are also

47:27

richer today. Their valuation is higher, meta is bigger, right? TikTok is a phenomenon.

47:35

I think we're just looking at a very standard thing where the

47:38

in what the market rewarded and what society at least says it wanted may have not been the same.

47:44

And if I had a person from one of those companies sitting here, they would say, look, we're paying

47:48

attention to what the users actually do. They might say whatever they say in your classroom,

47:53

but people are spending longer than ever on TikTok, on Instagram, on some of these sites.

47:59

And the advertising is working better than ever. And I'm not sure that they are wrong.

48:08

They can only be made wrong by society making a decision which disciplines the market into a

48:15

different formation than it would naturally or currently be in. Yeah, I mean, again, I think I

48:21

mostly agree. I do think again that companies can make decisions that are irrational in their own

48:26

long term interests because they're especially in Silicon Valley. There's a culture really

48:31

of focusing on these shorter term metrics and A.B. tests. So then you get into something that

48:36

you're beginning to touch there, which is diffusion. And one place where you do have a view that

48:42

is sort of different from some people in Silicon Valley is it it's going to be much harder

48:47

for AI to show up in the economy for AI to show up in the world than people think that there is not

48:52

a one-to-one between intelligence and that. So talk to me a bit about diffusion. Yeah, this really

48:58

clicked for me actually a few months after we wrote this essay when I was looking at Amtrak's

49:03

proud announcements of the new train sets that they had purchased for their Asella series.

49:09

Apparently it can go 165 miles per hour. At first I thought this is going to be amazing. That's

49:14

way faster than the trains currently go. And then I dug into it a little bit more and it turns out

49:20

the limiting speed is not the trains themselves. It's the tracks that are too curved and the

49:25

signaling infrastructure that is centuries old. And those things are not changing. And so the

49:30

average speed hasn't really budged much. It's still 65 to 70 miles per hour. And it struck me that

49:35

this was you know this is kind of an elegant way to say what we've been trying to say in AI

49:40

is normal technology, which is that most of the time AI is the trains. It's not the track.

49:46

So AI is accelerating a part of the process that was never the bottleneck to begin with. It's so

49:52

many other things that are more infrastructural things that happen around the AI. Organizational

49:58

culture, regulation, even you know our abilities socially to accept the level of year to year change

50:05

in our lives. Things like self-driving cars, no matter how many lives they might save. It's so much

50:11

of a kind of a shock to society that it will almost inevitably lead to what we've been seeing already

50:16

the kind of political backlash. And it's going to take quite a while I think to make all the societal

50:21

adjustments to be able to deploy these technologies. If we ever do. So this part of AI, the ASTRIM

50:27

incredibly skeptical of right you'll hear a Sam Holtman say talk about how AI through innovation

50:34

is going to help us solve our our energy problems. Another way to sort of distill down that idea

50:41

is it the binding constraint right now on clean energy is intelligence. But it's not it's not.

50:49

We know we have much better energy technologies and we're currently using for vast amounts of our

50:55

energy infrastructure. And we're not doing it because of it would be against some people's profits.

51:01

We're not doing it because there are political limits to building in the real world. We're not doing

51:06

it because Donald Trump hates solar and wind power. We're not doing it for all kinds of reasons. And

51:11

it feels to make a lot of things like that that if you accelerate or increase the amount of intelligence

51:18

behind it, you just run like into the other rate limiters in society, right? Drug development has

51:25

testing and you know the FDA and all the I mean abundance my book is very much about this in other

51:30

areas. We're aware of how to make faster trains and make them in other places. We don't and it's not

51:35

clear to me why AI would solve those problems quickly or potentially at all. That's right. And on

51:42

top of that there's various kinds of arms races. So there was this great report by insurance

51:48

companies last week that talked about how AI has already apparently over the last few years added

51:55

a billion dollars to medical expenses because hospitals are using it to be able to code more

52:02

complex conditions for the same diagnosis and same treatment. Of course we should be skeptical

52:07

of any specific numbers they quote, but the New York Times article about it had you know other

52:12

people academics making the same point. And yeah, it's a kind of arms race that we see a lot.

52:17

We see it in the legal profession AI for law. There's so much excitement about that. But it's AI

52:23

versus AI. It's an arms race where the equilibrium simply shifts upwards. I have a paper about this

52:29

with Justin Curl. And what we talk about there is that not only is there an arms race, there are

52:36

other bottlenecks like if you make lawsuits a lot more efficient, there are still only a finite

52:41

number of judges. And I think we need, you know, we need those human judges. We shouldn't

52:47

replace human judges with AI. I think even if that's more efficient in some sense, to me that's

52:52

definitionally almost axiomatically that's giving up control over, you know, the course of

52:57

human destiny to AI because judges make law. And that's not something we should be giving up to.

53:01

Yeah. So those are some really fundamental bottlenecks. I want to get back at that AI versus AI

53:05

point you just made there because I think this is really underplayed. I think a lot about why

53:10

did the internet not lead to a larger increase in global productivity and innovation than it did?

53:17

And I always think the reason is that while did all the things that the

53:21

IELUS wanted it to do, it actually did make it possible to collaborate with people all over the

53:26

world instantly. It did make virtually the entire corpus of human knowledge first available

53:31

to us then available turned out to AI to train on. Yeah. It also did this opposite thing.

53:38

Like it did speed us up and it also slowed us down. It distracted us. So now while you're working

53:43

on something, you're clicking back and forth from your email and into an online game and over to

53:50

social media and your ability to focus is degraded. And you know, there's tremendously more porn,

53:56

which appears to have had an effect on whether or not people are forming real life human relationships.

54:01

That adding or reducing friction in one area also reduces it in areas that are maybe less

54:06

beneficial. And when you think of adding intelligence, well, that intelligence is going to add on the

54:13

other side of things too. And I always think that we at the beginning of a technology, we think of

54:19

all the ways it can make everything better. And I think we think a lot right now with AI about the

54:24

ways it could make things dramatically worse, right? Huge cybersecurity events or destruction of

54:30

the financial system or human extinction. But just the ways it might make things worse in

54:36

banal fashions, where it just like increases the ability of people to waste everybody else's time

54:45

is a little bit underplayed in my view. For sure. And you know, it's not just banal. I think there

54:51

are a lot of these catastrophic harms that are pretty serious. With the industrial revolution,

54:56

we had several decades of horrible labor conditions. I think with AI as well, while there has been

55:03

so much focus on job displacement, what there has been much less focus on is how it's changing job

55:09

quality. And I think this is a big underappreciated area because AI is turning a lot of knowledge

55:16

workers into managers of AI agents, right? And the thing about being a manager is it's kind of a

55:22

shitty experience because you're responsible for other people's mistakes. You don't get to practice

55:27

the craft that you trained for, but you know, as human managers, we don't get to complain. It's

55:31

higher pay, it's higher status. We chose it. And of course, mentoring people is gratifying with

55:36

a, you don't get any of those benefits. You have to manage this agent and be responsible for its

55:41

mistakes. But you don't get to practice the craft. I think we can design AI agents differently to

55:45

avoid this. But right now that's kind of where things are going. And yeah, I think we should be

55:50

very concerned about that. So how much of though does this story that we are telling here lead to a

55:56

a theory of what's going to happen in the economy, which is very jagged, that the things where you

56:00

need diffusion into the real world, right? Things have to happen physically. Buildings need to be built,

56:05

energy, you know, transmission, lines, you need to be laid down. That has such powerful rate

56:10

limiting on it that it can't accelerate that fast. Meanwhile, inside the digital world,

56:16

things can move very, very, very fast. So, you know, in terms of what's going to happen to,

56:21

you know, white collar workers who they work kind of completely on a computer and their work

56:25

actually can be automated, you know, they're in a call center or something like that.

56:29

Or kind of separately, like all the cyber crime stuff we're talking about and the cyber security.

56:34

That I think a, a version of this future playing out that worries me is that actually,

56:42

most of what would improve people's lives has to happen in like the physical real world.

56:47

But where AI is going to be able to move the fastest is in the digital world.

56:53

And as an equilibrium, I don't think that sounds like the world and which we're getting the

56:58

most benefit from AI and it might in fact be the world we're getting the most harmed from it.

57:02

Yeah, that's possible. I don't know. I think there are ways, you know, we can change that.

57:08

I don't think fast is that fast, first of all, like you mentioned call centers. I mean,

57:15

those are still here, you know, when Chatchy PT was released, so many people were predicting that

57:20

within a year we would have replaced all of them. I mean, chatbot, it's right there in the name.

57:24

If, as is likely, AI is going to make call center workers a lot more productive.

57:29

There's a lot of latent demand. A lot of the time we don't call call centers because it's a

57:34

frustrating experience. So once again, it's a Japanese paradox thing.

57:37

You want to describe about this?

57:38

Yes, certainly. Yeah. So it's the idea that when something becomes cheaper to produce,

57:43

there's now more demand for it. Let's look at the sector where the capabilities are already

57:48

the most advanced, which is probably software engineering. It used to be extremely expensive

57:53

to produce software. So only maybe a few tens of thousands of lines of code worldwide were written

57:59

per year. And now that's expanded by something like a million fold. And so over the long run,

58:05

you know, whether this is going to be something that increases demand for software engineers or

58:11

whether the rocky job prospects we're seeing for junior software engineers are going to continue

58:16

remains to be seen, I think either as possible. But, you know, either way, if this happens over

58:22

the course of 20 years, again, that is in line with other major shifts, such as the industrial

58:26

revolution where many jobs went away, but many other new jobs were created. Another example,

58:33

translation jobs, you know, way back around 2016, machine, this is obviously way before what we

58:39

call a generative AI now, translation models became pretty close to human parity. But those jobs

58:46

are still pretty intact. The nature of the job has changed a lot. So once again, there's there's a

58:50

lot more demand that has been unlocked by the fact that you can translate anything to any language now.

58:56

So, Jevin's paradox. I had just did this conversation with Bill Gates. And when I brought that up,

59:02

he was a little bit withering about it. So, you know, the Jevin's paradox, name a blue collar

59:07

profession that's subject to Jevin's paradox. You do not care about blue collar. I do care about

59:13

blue collar. So the question is you. Anything in the blue collar realm. So I think the subject to that.

59:17

And his point was look, software engineering is indeed a sector of the economy where there's a lot

59:24

of unmet demand, you know, arguably everybody would like their own software engineers. So in a world

59:30

where you rapidly accelerate that, you can get this demand effect where it just creates more demand

59:34

for software engineers because now they're cheaper. But what he went on to say was that a lot of

59:39

things aren't like that. You think of say a truck driver. If we get to the point where trucks are

59:45

driverless, one, there is only so much demand for trucking. And two, there's no longer a driver in

59:51

that truck. If you look at a lot of the people who got their jobs automated away or sent to China

59:56

and manufacturing, it is true that the economy kept growing. But many of those people individually

1:00:01

had a very, very, very hard time. And so his argument is Jevin's paradox is not going to be big enough

1:00:07

to handle this because there are too many areas of the economy where there's not

1:00:12

latent demand. There's only as much demand as there is. How do you look about that?

1:00:17

Yeah, I mean, he's completely right about the truck drivers, I think. Totally agree there.

1:00:22

The demand there is relatively fine. The question is whether that's the rule or the exception.

1:00:27

And let me put it this way. Look at what we're doing here. Nobody asked for this.

1:00:31

You know, if you went back in time, a hundred years or two hundred years, it would be like,

1:00:35

how is this a real job? Most of the jobs that we have today are jobs that are kind of higher up

1:00:41

than Maslow's hierarchy, if you will. They're not meeting some actual real fixed demand or need

1:00:47

that people need in order to lift their lives. We do these things because they're fun and people

1:00:53

like to listen to it. Most white collar jobs are like that. That's my view. Most white collar jobs

1:00:59

do have Jevin's paradox. If it gets easier to produce more of, there will be demand for it,

1:01:05

especially as people's incomes as well rise very gradually. And there's more spending on these,

1:01:11

less necessary, more luxury kinds of things. And blue collar as well. There's a great essay by

1:01:16

Alex Emas calls, what will be scarce? And he points out that a job of a Starbucks barista,

1:01:23

for instance, all right, he should not exist. We've long known how to automate that. We can

1:01:27

make coffee at home even. I don't know if he said that specific thing. But that's an example where

1:01:31

it's the relational nature of the job that matters. And therefore, those are going to be, I think,

1:01:36

pretty stable even if AI makes it in some way cheaper to do. And so I think the truck driver,

1:01:42

kinds of jobs are more of the exception. So I think as we come to a close here,

1:01:46

what would have to happen in the next couple of years for you to say,

1:01:52

oh, this is looking less normal than we thought or this is more of course than we thought. What

1:01:57

is the evidence that would have to come in for you to like significantly alter your thesis?

1:02:02

For sure. Yeah, there's stuff on the economy, there's stuff on safety. On economy, if we start to see

1:02:08

at some capability level, it's not the same process of humans simply adapting to it and, you know,

1:02:15

using it to amplify their productivity and managing the agents, which is what we're seeing so far.

1:02:20

But instead starts to wholesale replace whether a software engineer or any other profession,

1:02:25

I think that would be pretty different from what we're predicting for the most part. And then on

1:02:31

safety, especially with companies claiming that they're close to recursive self-improvements,

1:02:37

I mean, I don't think they should, you know, plunge forward towards fully autonomous recursive

1:02:41

self-improvement in the first place, which I think you've said as well. But nonetheless, our view

1:02:46

is that even if that happens, it's not going to lead to superintelligence because the bottlenecks

1:02:50

the superintelligence are external. There is nothing you can do in a lab that's going to teach the AI

1:02:55

model, you know, how to cure cancer or whatever it is the companies are hoping for. But again,

1:03:00

that's an empirical claim and that would certainly completely falsify our thesis.

1:03:05

Then I'll ask our final question. What are three books you'd recommend to the audience?

1:03:08

Sure. You know, in this conversation, I've generally had a bit more optimistic take on things than

1:03:15

were used to hearing, especially on AI safety. So maybe in keeping with that, I really like Hannah

1:03:21

Richie's book, not the end of the world. She has a new book, but this one's from 2024 and I still

1:03:26

like it very much. The subtitle is something like, how we can be the first generation to build a

1:03:31

sustainable planet. It's an optimistic take on climate, which is of course usually full of doom and

1:03:36

gloom stories. So I really liked it for that reason. It's very optimistic book on technology. I

1:03:41

also like that book a lot. And it makes you realize that we actually do make things that are better

1:03:46

over time, which I think sometimes we can get into an overly negative place in technology.

1:03:50

Right. On China, which is of course a topic that so many people are interested in, I'm sure you

1:03:56

have heard this book recommendation a lot. I liked Dan Wong's breakneck. A lot of echoes if

1:04:01

abundance as well, but this idea of thinking about a lawyer-release society versus an engineering

1:04:08

society was I thought a really good and succinct way to capture a lot of the macro and micro differences.

1:04:16

And then the last one is an old classic. If I can say as a preamble, I read a two-page paper one

1:04:23

time called how complex systems fail. I thought the paper was about software. I realized in fact

1:04:29

that it was about medical systems written by an anesthesiologist. And I learned that there is

1:04:33

the study of systems that actually explain the patterns in all kinds of systems, natural and

1:04:38

social and engineered systems. And that led me to the book Systems Thinking by Danella Meadows from

1:04:44

many many years ago. Arvind Narayanan, thank you very much. Thank you, Azarat. This has been so fun.

1:04:53

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